The EU is reviewing Brussels Ia, the rules on which court hears a cross-border case and how its judgment is enforced. What works, what may change and why now.
14 min read
On 1 September 2026 the European Commission opened a public consultation and a call for evidence on the future of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, known in English as Brussels Ia or the Brussels I Recast. The consultation runs until 24 November 2026. The call for evidence sets out three policy options, ranging from leaving the text as it is to a substantial reform. It gives the fourth quarter of 2027 as the indicative date for a legislative proposal.
The regulation rarely makes headlines, yet it sits underneath almost every civil or commercial dispute that crosses a border inside the EU. It answers the two questions you meet as soon as the other side lives in another country: whose courts can hear the case, and what the resulting judgment is worth in the country where the assets are. It leaves a third question only half answered, which is what happens when the other side is outside the EU altogether. That gap is one of the reasons the Commission is reopening the text.
The route the system took to get here explains both what works today and why these particular points are now on the table.
Brussels Ia is the EU regulation that decides which Member State's courts have jurisdiction in a cross-border civil or commercial dispute. It also lets a judgment given in one Member State be recognised and enforced in all the others. Family law, succession and insolvency have their own instruments and sit outside it.
Its roots go back to the Brussels Convention of 1968. In 2001 the convention was turned into a regulation, No 44/2001, and in 2012 that regulation was recast. The recast was adopted on 12 December 2012 and has applied since 10 January 2015 to proceedings started on or after that date. Denmark applies it through a separate agreement with the EU signed in 2005.
The easiest way to picture the regime is as a single map drawn for the whole Union. Before it, each country used its own map, and a claimant could never be sure the roads on one matched the roads on the next. Brussels Ia gives every Member State the same map for civil and commercial disputes. The same rules decide where a claim may be brought, and the same rules decide whether the judgment will be accepted at the other end of the journey.
The Commission's own 2025 report calls it "indisputably the backbone of EU private international law".
The starting point is simple and deliberately predictable. You sue the defendant in the courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled (Article 4). For a company, domicile is the place of its statutory seat, its central administration or its principal place of business (Article 63). The claimant is the one who travels. The defendant, who did not choose to litigate, defends on home ground. If Article 4 points to Spain, what follows is ordinary civil litigation in Spain, with Spanish rules on admissibility and time limits.
Article 7 opens an alternative. In a contractual dispute you may also sue in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. For the two commonest contracts the regulation fixes that place itself. For a sale of goods, it is where the goods were or should have been delivered. For services, it is where the services were or should have been provided. In tort, you may sue where the harmful event occurred or may occur.
The formula is tidy until the service has no physical address. In VariusSystems (C-526/23), a Vienna company had developed and operated software for a customer established in Germany, used to evaluate COVID-19 tests. Was the service provided where the code was written or where it was used? On 28 November 2024 the Court of Justice answered that the place of performance is where the customer accesses the software, that is, where it consults and uses it. The Commission's report lists two questions that national courts keep sending to Luxembourg: the place of performance, and the location of purely financial loss.
Articles 17 to 19 tilt the field where one party is a consumer and the trader pursues or directs its activities to the consumer's Member State. The consumer may sue at home or in the trader's courts. The trader may sue the consumer only in the consumer's Member State. A clause in the terms and conditions pointing elsewhere will generally fail, because Article 19 admits only narrow exceptions, such as an agreement reached after the dispute has arisen. The Court of Justice has set out how to decide whether a website "directs" its activity to other Member States. It has looked at signs such as international dialling codes, a neutral domain such as .com or .eu, or reviews from customers in several countries (Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, C-585/08 and C-144/09).
Parties can take the question out of the default rules by agreeing in advance which courts will hear their disputes. Under Article 25, a clause choosing the courts of a Member State is valid whatever the parties' domicile, and it is exclusive unless they agree otherwise. It must be in writing or evidenced in writing, and any electronic communication that provides a durable record counts as writing. The clause also stands on its own feet: its validity cannot be challenged merely on the ground that the rest of the contract is invalid.
A jurisdiction clause is a flag planted before the ground is contested, and Article 31(2) makes sure it stays upright. Once the court named in an exclusive clause is seised, the courts of every other Member State must stay their proceedings until the chosen court has ruled on its own jurisdiction. That blunts a familiar tactic, the pre-emptive claim filed in a slow court to delay the inevitable.
The flag has limits. It cannot override the protective rules for consumers, employees and insured persons. It cannot displace the exclusive jurisdictions in Article 24 either, such as disputes over rights in rem in land or the validity of registered patents. And if a defendant enters an appearance and does not contest jurisdiction, that court acquires it (Article 26), unless another court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24.
This is where the 2012 recast made its boldest move. Under the old regulation, a creditor holding, say, a Dutch judgment had to obtain a declaration of enforceability, the exequatur, in the country of enforcement before any bailiff could act. Brussels Ia abolished that step. A judgment enforceable in its Member State of origin is enforceable in the others with no declaration required (Article 39), and recognition needs no special procedure (Article 36).
Picture the old exequatur as a customs post where every judgment had to stop and have its papers checked. The post has been dismantled. What travels with the judgment now is a standard certificate issued by the court of origin on the form in Annex I (Article 53). It works much like a bill of lading. It identifies the cargo, confirms the judgment is enforceable, and states the recoverable costs and interest, so that the enforcement authority at the destination can act on it and leave the case closed.
To enforce, you give that authority a copy of the judgment and the certificate (Article 42). The certificate must be served on the debtor before the first enforcement measure (Article 43). From there, the judgment is enforced under the same conditions as a local one (Article 41). If the assets are in Spain, it is enforced as a Spanish judgment would be.
The debtor keeps one door open. On the debtor's application, enforcement must be refused if one of the grounds in Article 45 applies (Article 46). The list is short:
Everything else is off limits. The court addressed cannot review the judgment as to its substance (Article 52). Outside those protective and exclusive rules, it cannot review the original court's jurisdiction either (Article 45(3)).
Public policy is a narrow gate, but it does open. Real Madrid (C-633/22) was decided on 4 October 2024 under the 2001 regulation. The football club and a member of its medical team had obtained damages in Spain against the publisher of Le Monde and one of its journalists, and sought to enforce them in France. The Court of Justice held that enforcement must be refused where it would cause a manifest breach of press freedom under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The same public-policy ground sits today in Article 45(1)(a).
Brussels Ia settles where to sue and how the judgment travels. Two other regulations add ready-made procedures for common cross-border claims, and their decisions circulate even more freely.
The European order for payment (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006) is built for uncontested money claims. The debtor has 30 days from service to lodge a statement of opposition, and need not give reasons. If no opposition arrives, the order becomes enforceable. It is then recognised and enforced across the other Member States with no declaration of enforceability and no possibility of opposing its recognition. If the debtor does oppose, the claim continues in ordinary proceedings unless the claimant has asked for them to end. The European Small Claims Procedure (Regulation (EC) No 861/2007) covers cross-border claims of up to €5,000 through standard forms, and its judgments also circulate with no declaration of enforceability.
In Spain the European order for payment has a practical advantage. Spanish judges' assemblies treat it as exempt from the prior settlement attempt that other civil claims must now document, as explained in our note on what Spanish courts check before admitting a claim for unpaid invoices. Where the debtor is a Spanish company and there is no judgment yet, the domestic route is set out in our guide to how debt recovery works in Spain.
For the UK, Brussels Ia stopped applying to new proceedings at the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020. Proceedings already under way by then stayed under Brussels Ia, and anything issued from 1 January 2021 fell outside it.
The obvious substitute was the 2007 Lugano Convention, the treaty that extends a system closely modelled on the Brussels rules to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The UK applied to join on 8 April 2020. Accession requires the consent of every contracting party, and on 28 June 2021 the EU told the depositary it was not in a position to consent. In the Commission's view, Lugano accompanies the single market and is meant for states closely integrated with it, while relations with other third countries belong in the Hague conventions. The application remains formally pending, as the UK Government confirmed to Parliament in January 2026.
One instrument covered the gap from the first day: the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The UK joined it in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021. It obliges courts in both the UK and the EU to respect an exclusive choice of court and to recognise the resulting judgment. Its reach is limited in two ways. It applies only to exclusive clauses, so non-exclusive and asymmetric clauses fall outside it. And the EU and the UK disagree on its start date. In the Commission's reading it applies between them only to clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, while the UK treats it as having applied continuously since 1 October 2015.
The second bridge took longer to build. The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters entered into force for the EU, except Denmark, on 1 September 2023. It entered into force for the UK on 1 July 2025. A judgment from a UK court can now circulate in the EU, and the other way round, under common conditions, provided the proceedings were started on or after 1 July 2025.
The bridge carries lighter traffic than the old road. Hague 2019 contains no direct rules on which court may hear a case. It only checks, at the recognition stage, that the judgment rests on one of the jurisdictional links it accepts. It leaves out whole subject areas, among them defamation, privacy and intellectual property. It also keeps the intermediate step that Brussels Ia abolished, because the procedure for recognition and enforceability is governed by the law of the State where enforcement is sought. For enforcing a foreign judgment in Spain, that means an exequatur application to the Court of First Instance, or to the commercial court in matters within its remit, under Law 29/2015 on international legal cooperation in civil matters. The Convention supplies the conditions.
Some UK judgments fall outside both Hague conventions, typically those from proceedings issued before 1 July 2025 with no exclusive clause. They depend on the national law of the country where enforcement is sought. In Spain, that is again Law 29/2015.
Here the common map simply stops at the border. When the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, Article 6 hands jurisdiction back to each Member State's national law. A few rules keep working whatever the defendant's domicile:
A claimant domiciled in a Member State may also rely on that country's national rules against the foreign defendant on the same footing as its nationals.
The result is twenty-seven different maps for the same situation. Spain, for instance, gives its courts jurisdiction over a non-EU defendant in two main cases (Article 22 quinquies of the Organic Law of the Judiciary). In contract, the obligation must have been performed, or be due to be performed, in Spain. In tort, the harmful event must have occurred on Spanish territory. Other Member States accept wider grounds, some of them exorbitant, and others narrower ones. The Commission's report points to the multiplier effect: a judgment obtained on such a national ground still circulates across the whole EU under Brussels Ia, even where the original court's jurisdiction was exorbitant.
Cases with several defendants feel the gap most. Article 8(1) lets you sue a group of defendants together at the domicile of one of them. In Sapir (C-645/11), however, the Court held that the rule does not reach a co-defendant domiciled outside the EU. A claim against an EU parent company and its subsidiary in a third country can therefore split into two proceedings in two countries, with the risk of irreconcilable judgments. The report singles out business and human rights litigation as the field where this bites hardest.
On the enforcement side, Brussels Ia does not deal with judgments from third countries at all. They reach the EU by one of three routes: the Lugano Convention for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, the Hague conventions where both States are parties, or the national law of the country of enforcement. The United States, for example, has signed the 2019 Hague Convention but has not ratified it.
The Commission's report on the application of the regulation, COM(2025) 268, published on 2 June 2025, started the clock. Its verdict is broadly positive. After more than ten years, the regulation has largely achieved its aims of legal certainty on jurisdiction and simpler enforcement, and abolishing exequatur has reduced costs and court workload. The report then lists the points worth revisiting:
The call for evidence published with the consultation turns that list into three options:
The Commission frames the review in terms of competitiveness and cites its Communication towards a 28th regime for EU companies, COM(2026) 320. It has also undertaken to assess whether aspects of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) belong in the text. An evaluation and an impact assessment run back to back, supported by an external study. The consultation is at an early stage and no option has been chosen. The fourth quarter of 2027 is an indicative date for a proposal, which would then still have to pass through the European Parliament and the Council.
The text in force is the one that governs, and it will stay that way for some time. Inside the EU, the working questions are the same as they have been since 2015:
Once there is a judgment, the Article 53 certificate does the travelling and the grounds for refusal are few. Outside the EU, the answer turns on the country involved, the date proceedings began and the exact wording of the jurisdiction clause. That is precisely the terrain the review may redraw. Whether a claim of a given size justifies proceedings at all is a separate question, and worth answering first. A short self-check on whether a lawyer in Spain is worth it helps frame it.
It is Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, also called the Brussels I Recast. It sets common rules on which Member State's courts hear cross-border civil and commercial disputes and on how judgments from one Member State are recognised and enforced in the others. It has applied since 10 January 2015.
You obtain a certificate from the court that gave the judgment (Article 53). You present it, with a copy of the judgment, to the enforcement authority in the country where the assets are (Article 42). The certificate is served on the debtor before the first enforcement measure, and enforcement then follows local rules.
It is no longer required between EU Member States for judgments in proceedings started since 10 January 2015 (Article 39). The debtor can still apply for refusal on the limited grounds in Article 45. Exequatur remains the route for many judgments from outside the EU, including UK judgments recognised under the 2019 Hague Convention.
If the companies agreed an exclusive jurisdiction clause, the chosen court has jurisdiction (Article 25). If not, the case goes to the courts of the defendant's domicile (Article 4). Alternatively, it can go to the courts for the place of performance: where the goods were delivered, or where the services were provided (Article 7(1)).
It does not apply to proceedings started from 1 January 2021. Between the UK and the EU, exclusive choice of court agreements fall under the 2005 Hague Convention. Judgments from proceedings started on or after 1 July 2025 can be recognised under the 2019 Hague Convention. The UK's application to join the Lugano Convention remains pending.
Jurisdiction is decided by the national law of each Member State (Article 6), except for consumer and employment claims, exclusive jurisdictions and Article 25 clauses. Common EU rules for these defendants appear in Option 3 of the current review.
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